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Jeffrey M. Lacker
T
hree types of money are provided monopolistically by the government
in the United States: coin, currency, and reserve balances with Federal
Reserve Banks. Together, they make up the monetary base. Although it
is common to think of government money as virtually costless to produce, the
real resource costs are substantial, as shown in Table 1. In 1991 the cost of
providing currency was $393.2 million, most of which was incurred in verify-
ing and sorting deposits of used currency and replacing unﬁt notes with new
currency.
Under current arrangements, banks can deposit used currency and withdraw
ﬁt currency at par. Thus currency costs are not borne directly by banks, but
instead are funded out of general government revenues.1 True, restrictions on
banks’ deposit and withdrawal of currency help limit Federal Reserve costs,
but these costs are not borne by users. In contrast, all of the costs associated
with the provision of reserve balances are recovered through “service fees,” as
mandated by the Monetary Control Act of 1980.2
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1 Costs associated with currency and coin operations directly reduce the Federal Reserve’s
payment to the U.S. Treasury. The Fed buys newly printed currency at cost from the Bureau of
Engraving and Printing and newly minted coin at face value from the United States Mint.
2 The Monetary Control Act of 1980 mandated fees for Federal Reserve services, including
“currency and coin services” (12 USC x248a), but this phrase is interpreted to mean only coin
wrapping and currency and coin transportation services, which are omitted from the tables. See
Board of Governors (1980).
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Operating expenses 139.9 24.5 140.8
Replacement costs 253.3 44.0 0
Total 393.2 68.5 140.8
Recovered from fees 0 0 140.8
Unrecovered 393.2 68.5 0
Sources: See Appendix B.
This article examines whether the Fed should continue to subsidize the use
of currency. In particular, I argue that the Fed should charge a currency deposit
fee, effectively paying less than par when converting currency into reserve
balances, and should remove the rationing constraints on currency deposits and
withdrawals. This recommendation should not be surprising, since it follows
from standard economic reasoning. The costs of a government-provided service
should, in general, be paid by the users to ensure that use is efﬁcient.
However, I argue that a partial subsidy is desirable, in the sense that the
deposit fee should be less than marginal cost. The reasoning is again standard.
There is likely to be a “market failure” that makes the private willingness to
pay for ﬁt currency less than the social beneﬁts of ﬁt currency. The market
failure arises because currency generally trades at par, regardless of the quality
of the note, due to the inconvenience of quality-adjusted currency prices. As
a result, willingness to pay is less than the social beneﬁts and the Fed should
subsidize the provision of currency quality by charging less than marginal cost.
In no case, however, should the deposit fee be zero; efﬁciency of the division of
currency processing between banks and the Fed requires a strictly positive fee.
In what follows I focus solely on currency policy, even though coin use
is similarly subsidized and the arguments against its free provision apply with
equal force.
1. SOME BACKGROUND ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT MONEY3
Depository institutions can hold reserve account balances at a Federal Reserve
Bank. These reserves are book-entry demand deposits that can be transferred
3 See Booth (1989) for a historical review of Federal Reserve currency and coin operations.      
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to other banks. Reserve account balances are also used for automated clearing-
house transactions in which recurring payments are made via prearranged wire
transfers. Federal Reserve Banks charge fees for transfers of reserve balances
and generally recover all of the associated costs.
A branch or ofﬁce of a bank may withdraw currency and coin from a Fed-
eral Reserve Bank, deducting the par value of the withdrawal from its reserve
balance. Deposits of currency and coin are credited at par. In both cases the
bank pays for transportation, generally via an armored carrier service.
Incoming deposits of currency at Federal Reserve Banks are processed on
high-speed equipment that removes wrong denomination and counterfeit notes
and veriﬁes the number of notes in the deposit. In addition, the equipment re-
moves and destroys “unﬁt” notes that have become soiled in circulation.4 The
remaining “ﬁt” notes are repackaged and stored. Withdrawals of currency are
met with ﬁt used notes and newly printed notes from the Bureau of Engraving
and Printing. Banks are not allowed to request new notes, but must accept the
mix that is sent to them. Coins are deposited and withdrawn in bags of standard
size and are veriﬁed by weighing.
Banks can process, sort, and reuse currency themselves. Tellers count and
sort currency, holding some for future use, and send unsatisfactory notes, sus-
pected counterfeits or “excess” notes to the Fed. Banks with more than one
branch sometimes process currency centrally at a “cash room,” collecting cur-
rency from branches with net inﬂows, and disbursing it to branches with net
outﬂows. Some banks sell currency directly to other neighboring institutions.
Some private transfers of currency are intermediated by armored carrier compa-
nies. The same high-speed currency-processing equipment used by the Federal
Reserve is available to private institutions, some of which, particularly larger
institutions, run currency-processing operations similar to the Fed’s (although
they do not destroy worn currency).
4 The U.S. Treasury deﬁnes unﬁt currency as “currency which is unﬁt for further circulation
because of its physical condition such as torn, dirty, limp, worn or mutilated.” 31 CFR 100.5.
Federal Reserve Banks have adopted more detailed deﬁnitions.
“Paper currency tendered for redemption in order to be classed as ﬁt for further cir-
culation must be fairly clean so that its class, denomination, and genuineness can be
determined without difﬁculty and must contain a sufﬁcient amount of life or sizing to
permit its being handled with facility. It should not contain heavy creases which break
the ﬁber of the paper and indicate that disintegration has begun. A ﬁt note when held
by one end in one hand and pressed into a slightly concave shape lengthwise should
sustain itself substantially on a line with the hand. It should not present a limp or
rag-like appearance. If a note has retained a fair amount of the original strength or
sizing, it is ﬁt unless it is so badly soiled as to be offensive, or it is torn, perforated
or otherwise mutilated. Mere creasing or wrinkling that has not broken nor seriously
weakened the note does not make it unﬁt. So-called ‘dog ears’ or bent corners do not
render notes unﬁt.” (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Operating Circular No. 14,
March 30, 1990, p. 3)      
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Federal Reserve Banks place restrictions on the deposit and withdrawal
of coin and currency by banks. The restrictions vary somewhat across Federal
Reserve ofﬁces, but all follow a set of guidelines adopted by the Board of Gov-
ernors (Board of Governors 1984). For example, some Federal Reserve Banks
offer access to only one bank ofﬁce per municipality. In large metropolitan
areas this constraint can force a bank to consolidate cash from its branch net-
work to its own cash room operation from which all deposits and withdrawals
are made. In contrast, a bank operating in a suburban or rural environment
can receive service at many of its branches. These constraints, called “access
controls,” effectively mandate signiﬁcant private processing for banks in certain
geographical areas.
Another key restriction is the prohibition of “cross-shipping”—the “deposit
of excess ﬁt currency and re-order of the same denomination within 5 business
days.” This restriction prevents a branch from depositing its incoming currency
without sorting and then obtaining ﬁt currency from the Fed to meet its with-
drawal demand. Both access and cross-shipping constraints are explicitly aimed
at limiting the volume of Fed currency processing. There is no empirical evi-
dence on the extent to which these constraints reduce such processing volume,
but anecdotal evidence suggests that it is quite substantial in some areas.
2. THE POLICY QUESTION
Currency, coin, and reserve account balances are the three components of the
monetary base. The essential policy question concerns the terms on which the
components of the monetary base can be exchanged for each other. Under
current policy the Fed stands ready to exchange any component of the mon-
etary base for any other component at a ﬁxed relative price of one (par) plus
transportation costs. The division of the base among currency, coin, and reserve
account balances is thus demand determined, while the total monetary base is
determined by monetary policy via open market operations.
As a consequence of the current policy and the fragmented structure of the
U.S. depository industry, the Fed acts as an intermediary in the ﬂow of currency.
Some bank branches experience net inﬂows of currency deposits, accumulat-
ing currency which they wish to exchange for reserve account balances, either
because their vault space is limited or because they want to convert excess
reserves to loanable funds. Some bank branches experience net outﬂows of
currency which they need to replace from reserve account balances. The Fed-
eral Reserve has a substantial inventory of currency, amounting to 21 percent
of outstanding currency at the end of 1991, for example.5
5 Out of $366 billion Federal Reserve notes outstanding on December 31, 1991, Federal
Reserve Banks held $78 billion, leaving $288 billion in the hands of banks and the public (Board
of Governors 1992, p. 246).        
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Table 2 Currency Costs, 1991
Millions of dollars, except where otherwise noted




Total processing costs 139.9
Printing new currency 253.3
Total costs 393.2
Number of notes received from circulation, millions 19,613
Cost per note, dollars. .0200
Sources: See Appendix B.
When a Federal Reserve Bank accepts a deposit of currency from a bank, in
effect it buys notes in “straps” of 100 notes each. When a Federal Reserve Bank
pays out currency to a bank, in effect it sells straps of currency. The objects
sold by the Fed—veriﬁed straps of ﬁt, genuine notes (“sorted straps”)—are
different from the objects bought by the Federal Reserve—unveriﬁed straps of
ﬁt and unﬁt notes, including some wrong denomination and counterfeit notes
(“unsorted straps”). The two are distinctly different economic commodities, just
as aluminum is different from bauxite and ﬂour is different from wheat. Real
resource costs must be incurred in receiving and storing unsorted straps, in pro-
cessing currency, in printing new replacement notes, and in paying out currency
withdrawals. From this point of view, Federal Reserve currency operations are
a productive economic activity, consisting of the transformation of unsorted
straps of mixed-quality currency into sorted straps of ﬁt currency. Table 2
provides a breakdown of Federal Reserve Bank currency-processing costs.
The “price” of Federal Reserve processing is the difference between what
the Fed charges for withdrawals of sorted straps of currency and what it pays
for deposits of unsorted straps. Access and cross-shipping controls act as ra-
tioning devices to limit the demand for Federal Reserve processing. The policy
issue, then, is a classic one. On what terms should a publicly provided service
be offered? Should it be provided free of charge with quantitative restric-
tions to ration demand? Or should it be offered at a price without quantitative
restrictions?
3. WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE CURRENT POLICY?
Under the current policy of rationed free provision—buying and selling cur-
rency at par with quantitative restrictions on deposits and withdrawals—banks’
currency-handling decisions are likely to be socially inefﬁcient. For example,      
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a bank with a large branch network could operate a cash room, incurring the
associated costs of processing. Alternatively, the bank could have branches
deposit and withdraw directly to and from the Fed, avoiding the cost of pro-
cessing altogether. By buying and selling currency at par, the Fed subsidizes
central bank processing relative to private currency processing. Some currency
processing now performed by the Fed is socially wasteful.
The quantitative restrictions embodied in access and cross-shipping con-
straints attempt to prevent overuse of Federal Reserve processing. For example,
restrictions on the number of bank branches served in a given geographic lo-
cality prevent duplicative shipping to and from the Fed when direct currency
transfers between branches would be less costly. Similarly, cross-shipping re-
strictions prevent some branches from having the Fed process currency that
they could process at lower cost themselves.
However, quantitative restrictions are generally less efﬁcient as a rationing
device. If the Federal Reserve knew the costs of various alternative private
currency-processing arrangements, it could design quantitative restrictions
which would exactly replicate the effect of efﬁcient prices. Unfortunately, the
necessary information is costly to acquire, and implementable rules cannot be
too complex or subjective. As a result, the simple rules in place are often
unrelated to the real resource costs of currency processing.
For example, two banks might have neighboring branches that qualify for
access, but if the banks merge only one branch would qualify. The real relative
costs of currency processing would not have changed, but access controls would
treat the two situations differently. Similarly, cross-shipping constraints affect
banks unequally, depending on their typical net deposit ﬂows. A branch with
equal currency deposits and withdrawals is forced to process currency itself. By
contrast, two neighboring branches with complementary currency ﬂows—one
receiving net inﬂows, the other meeting net outﬂows—have no incentive to
sort and transfer currency together, since they can have the Fed process it free.
Cross-shipping thus encourages private processing at branches with balanced
currency ﬂows but not at branches with net inﬂows or outﬂows.
4. PRICING WOULD BE BETTER THAN
QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS
An attractive alternative to rationing is to provide currency processing at a posi-
tive price without quantitative restrictions. One way to do this is to impose a fee
for depositing currency.6 Economic theory tells us that the price of a publicly
6 An alternative method would be to charge a fee for withdrawals of sorted ﬁt currency.
Any combination of deposit and withdrawal fees are possible as long as the price at which the
Fed sells currency is greater than the price at which the Fed buys it. I will restrict attention to a
deposit fee.      
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provided good should be set equal to the marginal social cost of production.7
This suggests that a currency deposit fee should be set equal to the marginal cost
of Federal Reserve currency processing. As a rough guide to the likely magni-
tude of such a price, Table 2 shows that the average total cost of Federal Reserve
currency operations is 2 cents per note. Under constant returns to scale, marginal
cost would equal average cost implying a deposit fee of 2 cents per note.8
A deposit fee equal to the marginal cost of Fed processing would have
the desirable property that banks’ decisions about currency handling would
no longer be biased towards Fed processing. If operating its own cash room
is less costly to a bank than sending currency to the Fed, that is because
private processing is socially less costly than Fed processing. Conversely, if
Fed processing is less costly to the bank than processing currency itself, it
is because Fed processing is socially less costly than private processing. The
cost of acquiring sorted currency from the Fed, relative to the cost of obtaining
privately sorted currency, would reﬂect actual relative resource costs. Appendix
A describes a simple model that illustrates this point. The model shows that in
the absence of any “market failure,” setting the deposit fee equal to the Fed’s
marginal cost results in the socially optimal allocation of currency processing.
A currency deposit fee would allow the elimination of quantitative re-
strictions on currency deposits and withdrawals, and would let banks decide
on the cost-minimizing pattern of use. Banks would determine whether it is
less costly for a particular branch to obtain currency directly from the Fed,
from other branches, or from central cash rooms. They would determine the
cost-minimizing frequency of shipments and whether cross-shipping is the least
costly arrangement. The potential overuse of Federal Reserve processing would
be curbed, since banks would efﬁciently ration such processing themselves. In
addition, and perhaps more important, the resulting volume of Fed currency pro-
cessing would be allocated efﬁciently across banks. The substitution of a deposit
fee for quantitative restrictions also would decentralize cost-minimization deci-
sions and let banks assess whether Fed or private processing is more efﬁcient.
5. WOULD THIS INTERFERE WITH PAR VALUE
EXCHANGE OF CURRENCY?
One advantage of paper currency in retail transactions is that it trades at par
value, which can be ascertained at a glance.9 In contrast, in many commodity
7 See B¨ os (1985), for a survey.
8 Using three years of data by Federal Reserve ofﬁce, Michael Dotsey (1991) estimates
long-run cost functions for high-speed sorting and for currency paying and receiving. He ﬁnds
economies of scale in both activities, with scale economy coefﬁcients (elasticity of total cost with
respect to output) of .92 and .84, respectively. This ﬁnding implies that marginal cost is about
1.7 to 1.8 cents per note.
9 See Fama (1983) for a discussion.     
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money schemes it was costly to establish the value of money being tendered
in exchange. For example, gold coins often would be weighed and assayed,
with the coins valued on the basis of the quantity of the gold they contained.
One would expect to see merchants offer discounts for less costly forms of
payment. Gasoline retailers sometimes offer discounts for purchases by cash,
check, or debit card, reﬂecting the costs of the ﬂoat associated with credit card
purchases.10 If the Federal Reserve paid less than par for deposits of currency,
then a merchant’s currency deposit would be more costly for a bank to accept.
Would banks impose new fees for currency deposits, passing along the cost of
the deposit fee charged by the Fed? Would merchants then charge a premium
for accepting payment in currency or offer a discount for non-cash payments?
Perhaps, but it provides no reason not to charge for currency deposits at the Fed.
The Fed charges for wire transfer payments and allows banks to decide whether
to pass the charges on to their customers. Similarly, efﬁciency would be max-
imized by allowing banks to decide whether to pass on currency deposit fees.
Merchants and banks already face many costs of handling currency, but
choose not to pass them on to consumers. For example, both currency and
checks are accepted at par in retail transactions, despite the fact that their costs
are very different. As it is, banks pay the cost of transporting currency to and
from the Federal Reserve, a fee than can be as high as 4 cents per note—twice
as high as the 2 cents per note deposit fee proposed above. Banks do not charge
consumers directly for cash transactions, but often charge retail merchants for
currency transactions. Retail businesses do not directly pass these costs along
to customers offering cash; instead they incorporate them into their overall cost
of doing business and assess customers only indirectly. In essence, we already
have nonpar currency at the wholesale level, coexisting with par currency at
the retail level. Such evidence suggests that currency would still generally
exchange at par under a deposit-fee scheme.11
A distinct but related question concerns the variation in quality across
notes. Par value exchange implies that old worn notes exchange one-for-one
with crisp new notes of the same denomination, despite the inferiority of worn
notes. If the Federal Reserve paid less than par for used currency deposits,
then accepting unﬁt currency would be more costly for a bank than accepting
ﬁt. Would banks impose fees for deposits of unﬁt currency, passing along the
cost of the deposit fee charged by the Fed? Would old, worn-out currency
be discounted in retail transactions, trading at quality-dependent prices like
used cars? Would the beneﬁts of improved efﬁciency in currency processing
be outweighed by the higher transactions costs of quality-dependent prices?
10 See Barron, Staten and Umbeck (1992).
11 Curtin (1983) reports evidence on the costs of different payment media to retail establish-
ments and why so few offer cash discounts.     
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It seems unlikely that our currency would trade at quality-dependent prices
under a deposit-fee scheme. First, it obviously would be cumbersome and in-
convenient for the price of a note to vary with the note’s physical condition. The
quality of each note tendered in a transaction would have to be assessed individ-
ually and a value mutually agreed upon by both parties. Since quality is difﬁcult
to deﬁne objectively, this could be a contentious process. The number of com-
putations required for a typical transaction would be larger, since the quality-
adjusted price of notes would have to be calculated both for the notes tendered
and for the notes given in change. Furthermore, merchants would have to keep
track of each note’s quality, either segregating notes or labeling them. For retail
transactions it seems far more convenient for currency to trade at face value.
If everyone else is accepting currency at prices that do not depend on note
quality, then your incentive to pay quality-dependent prices is minimal. You
might be willing to pay for the lower inconvenience provided by a high-quality
note while it is in your possession, but you will be unwilling to pay for the added
convenience to the person that accepts it from you at par. Quality differentials
would have to become relatively large to induce quality-dependent currency
prices. Therefore, one reason we do not see quality-dependent currency prices
is that the beneﬁts—improved resource allocation resulting from more accurate
relative prices—are less than the associated transactions costs.
Part of the reason quality differentials are not large enough to induce
quality-dependent prices is that the Fed essentially supports the price of old
currency relative to new currency. The Fed buys old currency at par, with-
drawing unﬁt notes from circulation and replacing them at par with new notes.
Worn notes are tendered to the Fed rather than exchanged at less than par. As
a result, the range of quality of notes in circulation is not large enough to make
quality-dependent pricing worthwhile. In most private durable goods markets,
in contrast, producers supply new goods but do not intervene in the market for
used goods. For example, automobile manufacturers sell new cars but do not
generally intervene in the market for used cars.12 The prices of used cars adjust
to reﬂect the value of old cars relative to new cars. If automobile manufacturers
supported the price of their used cars at close to the price of their new cars,
they would be forced to buy many old cars. The quality of the stock of cars in
use would be far higher on average and far more uniform, perhaps even trading
“at par.” Without manufacturer intervention, many consumers would pay large
sums to have an old car replaced with a new one. Under current Fed policy,
low-quality notes are rarely so bad that a consumer would be willing to pay
more than a small fraction of its value to have it replaced with a new one.
The legal tender provision of the Coinage Act is another reason currency
is likely to keep trading at par. The law prevents creditors from refusing to take
worn currency at par. This probably would prevent merchants from offering
discounts for high-quality notes.
12 Supel and Todd (1984) ﬁrst suggested this analogy.       
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6. WOULD THE QUALITY OF CURRENCY IN
CIRCULATION DECLINE?
The preceding discussion raises some pertinent questions. How would a deposit-
fee scheme affect the average quality of currency in circulation? By discour-
aging Fed processing, would it reduce the rate of destruction of unﬁt notes,
increasing the average life of a note? More generally, what is the optimal
quality of currency in circulation, and how can we attain the optimum?
As a benchmark, suppose that there is no “market failure” for currency
quality, in the sense that the willingness of private individuals to pay for a
higher-quality note is identical to its total social beneﬁts. We could then let
market forces determine the socially optimal level of currency quality, just as
they determine the quality of any privately produced durable good. It would be
crucial for the Fed to set the relative price of sorted and unsorted currency to
reﬂect the real costs of transforming unsorted straps into sorted straps. In this
case, private decisions would result in the socially optimal currency quality.
Figure 1, based on a model of currency processing described in Appendix
A, illustrates the interaction between currency quality and the price of pro-
cessing. The quality of currency in circulation is measured by the variable q,
the fraction of notes in circulation that are ﬁt rather than unﬁt.13 The vertical
axis displays the marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs associated with each
level of currency quality. The curve labeled MSC is the marginal social cost of
Federal Reserve currency processing and includes the cost of processing notes
plus the cost of printing new notes to replace the unﬁt notes destroyed. The
curve labeled MSB is the marginal social beneﬁt of higher-quality currency. The
socially optimal currency quality is q¤, where MSC equals MSB. This currency
quality maximizes social beneﬁts minus social costs, or net social welfare.
Underlying Figure 1 is the demand and supply for Fed processing. Banks
choose how much currency to send to the Fed and to withdraw from the Fed
based on the price of Fed processing—the difference between what the Fed
charges for withdrawals of ﬁt currency and what the Fed pays for unﬁt cur-
rency. A bank’s demand for Fed-processed currency determines the quality of
currency circulated by the bank. Fed processing volume determines the fraction
of circulating unﬁt notes that are destroyed each period and replaced with new
notes, and thus directly determines the quality of currency in circulation. A
price for Fed processing thus is equivalent to a “price” for currency quality,
since quality varies one-for-one with Fed processing volume.14
In the absence of market failure, private willingness to pay for currency
quality corresponds exactly to the marginal social beneﬁts of currency quality.
13 For simplicity, think of currency as either ﬁt or unﬁt, and suppose that over time ﬁt notes
randomly become unﬁt.
14 More precisely, the “price” of currency quality is the price of Fed processing times the
amount by which Fed processing volume must rise to increase quality by one unit.       
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In this case the optimal price of currency quality, r¤, is the marginal social cost
of quality and it directly determines the optimal price of Federal Reserve cur-
rency processing. Facing r¤, banks bear the full social cost of higher currency
quality, and so choose the socially optimal quality. Note that r¤ includes the
cost of printing new currency to replace the unﬁt currency in a deposit.
Would replacing the current system of quantitative restrictions with a de-
posit fee result in a decline in the quality of currency in circulation? Figure 1
shows that, by itself, imposing an optimal deposit fee reduces quality from q0
to q¤. But the level of quality under free provision with quantitative rationing
could be much less than q0,o rq¤ for that matter. Therefore, what happens
to currency quality depends upon how the level of quality under the current
policy compares with the optimal level of quality. Is currency quality now too
high or too low? One recent study of this question suggests that, if anything,
currency quality is currently above the social optimum.15
15 High-speed currency veriﬁcation and sorting machines are capable of distinguishing be-
tween 16 different currency soil levels and are set to destroy all notes at or below a given soil
level. The Federal Reserve System recently decided to reduce the threshold for destruction by one
setting, from 9 to 8 for one-dollar bills and from 10 to 9 for other denominations. This decision
was made after a study that documented the likely public reaction to the predicted change in
currency quality and the effect on new currency printing cost. Extensive surveys revealed that
lowering the threshold “would have a minimal impact on public acceptability of currency.” The
decision reﬂects the implicit judgment that the marginal social cost of the higher soil level setting
is larger than the marginal social beneﬁts of higher currency quality. See Federal Reserve System
(1991).    
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7. WHAT IF THERE IS A MARKET FAILURE FOR
CURRENCY QUALITY?
The fact that currency trades at par can lead to a market failure that complicates
the attempt to achieve the optimum level of currency quality. Banks choose the
quality of currency to supply for withdrawals, but that currency is passed on
and deposited at other banks. Because banks are small relative to the currency
market, they neglect the effect of their currency outﬂow on the quality of other
banks’ currency inﬂows. Banks ignore the effect of their currency-processing
decisions on the quality of currency in circulation, because they are not fully
compensated for the social value of the currency quality they supply. At a more
fundamental level, the source of the market failure is that the social beneﬁts
of quality-dependent note prices are smaller than the costs associated with the
inconvenience of such prices. Because prices do not vary with note quality,
people do not bear the full social costs and beneﬁts of their decisions.
There are some settings in which suppliers of high-quality currency can
obtain direct or indirect compensation for some of the social beneﬁts associ-
ated with high quality. Some institutional currency users actually pay to obtain
high-quality currency. For example, some banks pay to obtain higher-quality
currency for loading into automated teller machines. Many banks, hotels and
retail merchants prefer to use high-quality or even new currency in transactions
with their customers. Since obtaining high-quality currency often involves some
effort or expense, we can presume that the institution believes that its customers
prefer high-quality currency, and that providing it to them will result in implicit
remuneration such as enhanced goodwill or a higher probability of repeat busi-
ness. Thus the institution may be partially compensated by its customers for the
quality of currency disbursed, making them willing to pay a small premium to
arrange for better-quality currency. The demand by these institutions for better-
quality currency will reﬂect a portion of the social beneﬁts of better quality,
even though currency trades at par, without adjustment for quality.
For most transactions, however, such mechanisms of implicit compensa-
tion are generally lacking or incomplete. Therefore, the demand for ﬁt sorted
currency from the Fed, relative to the demand for unsorted currency, is likely
to understate society’s true demand for ﬁt currency. If so, setting the price of
currency processing equal to the Fed’s full marginal cost will lead to subopti-
mal currency quality. Figure 2 illustrates the dilemma. It is based on a model
(also described in Appendix A) in which private willingness to pay, the curve
labeled MWTP, is less than marginal social beneﬁts, the curve again labeled
MSB. Charging the full marginal social cost, r¤, results in suboptimal currency
quality, ˆ q, because the demand for Fed processing does not reﬂect true social
beneﬁts. The optimal price is the one that attains the optimal level of Fed cur-
rency processing and is equal to the marginal willingness to pay at the optimal
level of processing, r¤¤ in Figure 2. This price is less than full marginal cost and       
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subsidizes processing in order to counteract the divergence between the private
and social marginal beneﬁts of currency quality. The divergence is the direct
result of the fact that currency generally trades at par, unadjusted for quality.
It is quite unlikely that the optimal price is zero. For this to occur, marginal
private willingness to pay must be zero at the optimal quality. One component
of private willingness to pay is the costliness of bank currency processing;
banks are willing to pay to substitute Fed processing for their own. As long as
bank processing is at all costly there will always be a positive willingness to
pay for Fed processing.
8. AN ALTERNATIVE PRICING SCHEME
I have proposed a simple fee on all currency deposits, but other pricing schemes
are also worth considering. One attractive idea is a two-tiered scheme, with
a higher fee on deposits of ﬁt currency and a lower fee on deposits of unﬁt
currency.16 This would provide an enhanced incentive for banks to sort currency
themselves and deposit only the unﬁt, keeping the ﬁt in circulation. If banks’
currency-processing decisions are multidimensional, then a two-tiered scheme
can bring us closer to the social optimum. A two-tiered, quality-dependent
16 Cash Services Strategic Planning Task Force (1991).      
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pricing scheme thus could improve upon a simple deposit fee by inducing
banks to make more efﬁcient currency-processing choices.
Unfortunately, such a scheme would be quite costly to administer using
existing technology. Currently, notes are fed through processing machines in
continuous batches made up of many different deposits, and the number of
unﬁt notes is recorded for the entire batch, but not for each bank’s deposit.
Measuring the ﬁtness of a single deposit requires processing that deposit in
isolation as a single batch, at a signiﬁcantly larger cost. Measuring deposit
ﬁtness would be essential to a two-tiered pricing scheme, since banks would
have an incentive to misrepresent their deposits as unﬁt. An additional social
cost associated with a two-tiered scheme is that many depository institutions
would be induced to acquire the costly devices the Fed uses to measure quality.
If the social beneﬁts of more efﬁcient currency processing outweigh the
required administration and enforcement costs, a two-tiered pricing scheme
would represent an improvement over a simple deposit fee. A two-tiered scheme
probably is not signiﬁcantly better than a simple deposit fee under current ar-
rangements, however. The next generation of currency-processing equipment,
to be deployed in the next ﬁve years, will have the capability of measuring
individual deposit ﬁtness at little additional cost. A two-tiered scheme could
be worthwhile at that time.
9. PRECEDENTS
The position advocated here—paying less than par for worn money—may seem
radical, but it is far from new. Historically, mints often bought foreign and worn
domestic coin at the market price of the metal and then issued overvalued coins,
with most of the difference accounted for by “brassage,” the cost of minting.17
When the Bank of England bought worn gold coins for reminting, “there was
a small series of charges or proﬁts made for weighing, melting, assaying, the
turn of the scale, the difference of the assay reports, etc.,” plus a charge for
“demurrage,” the interest lost while the gold was being coined.18 Thus the dete-
rioration of coin has been a perennial problem for monetary authorities, and has
evoked changing policies as the technology underlying monetary arrangements
has changed.19
There is a more immediate precedent, however. From 1863 to 1935 in the
United States, national banks could issue their own notes, which circulated as
17 See de Roover (1948) p. 241.
18 Jevons (1875). The 19th century English economist was quite concerned about the quality
of English currency and actually performed his own physical experiments to estimate the rate at
which English gold sovereigns declined in weight. He also gathered information on the fraction
of coins that were below “legal limit,” meaning that they no longer qualiﬁed as legal tender and
could only be sold by weight (at a loss).
19 See, for example, Redish (1990).       
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currency. These notes were printed by the U.S. Treasury and shipped to the
bank for issue. At ﬁrst, notes could be redeemed at the issuing bank or at a
“redemption agent” designated by the issuing bank, generally in New York.
This made redemption costly, since by law the notes had to be redeemed at
par. As a result, the condition of national bank notes in circulation deteriorated.
In 1874, Congress authorized a “Redemption Agency” within the Treasury that
would redeem national bank notes at various locations around the country,
destroying worn and mutiliated notes and sending back to the issuing bank the
ﬁt notes and, if necessary, newly printed replacement notes.
National banks were charged for all of the expenses associated with note
issue and redemption. The banks were charged directly for the cost of the plates
and dies used to print their notes. They were also assessed a 1 percent tax on
outstanding notes (1/2 percent after 1900), out of which the other costs of
producing new notes were paid. The costs of redemption were divided pro rata
among banks on the basis of the amount of their notes redeemed. In addition,
banks paid all of the costs of shipping their own notes.
By all accounts national bank notes functioned as hand-to-hand currency,
and since they were collateralized by government securities, they were, in
effect, government currency. The resource costs associated with national bank
notes, arguably the model for Federal Reserve notes, were borne by private
entities. The policy of charging national banks for the costs of note issue
and redemption is thus directly analogous to my proposal to charge a fee for
currency deposits.20
10. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A central bank fee for deposits of worn currency is an uncomfortable notion
for many, but the proposal merely reﬂects standard economic reasoning. When
the government provides a service for which there are privately provided sub-
stitutes, economic theory tells us that it should not, in general, be provided free.
The current system of fees for wire transfers of reserve balances reﬂects just
such reasoning and was designed to improve economic efﬁciency by providing
the proper incentives to private decision makers.21 The goal of a currency-
processing fee is identical—to improve the efﬁciency of currency handling by
providing private decision makers with the proper incentives.
The fact that currency processing plays a role in our monetary system can
distract from the essential economics of the issue. Some express the view that
20 There are some minor differences. The cost of printing notes was charged to the issuing
national bank at the date of issue; under my proposal, the cost of printing notes would be charged
to depositors of used notes. Under the national bank policy, the deposit of notes with the Treasury
resulted in a charge to the issuing bank, not the depositing bank; under my proposal, the depositing
bank would be charged.
21 Board of Governors (1990).      
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par replacement of worn currency is somehow intrinsic to central banking or
the monetary mechanism. But monetary policy concerns the size of the total
monetary base, not the division of the base into its components; a deposit
fee would merely add to the cost of exchanging currency for reserve account
balances. Some express the view that par replacement is somehow required
“to furnish an elastic currency,” but again, this can be accomplished through
variations in the size of the total monetary base; as long as the composition
of the base is determined by demand, the currency supply will be sufﬁciently
elastic.22 Similar arguments were raised in objection to pricing other Federal
Reserve services in the early 1980s, but are no longer taken seriously. Indeed,
payments system efﬁciency is now a widely recognized public policy goal. A
currency deposit fee would help.
APPENDIX A: A Model of Currency Processing
This appendix describes a simple model designed to capture the interaction
between the price of Fed processing and the quality of currency in circulation.
The heart of the model is the decision problem of a representative “bank”
facing currency deposit and withdrawal ﬂows. The bank chooses the quality of
currency to supply, how much currency to process internally and how much
currency to deposit and withdraw from the Fed. The Fed processes deposited
currency, destroying unﬁt notes and replacing them with newly printed notes.
The Fed sets fees for deposits and withdrawals, and these directly affect banks’
processing decisions. Alternative fee policies affect currency quality, and I show
how policy can achieve the socially optimal currency quality.
I consider two versions of the model. In the ﬁrst version, the “no market
failure case,” currency prices depend on quality and affect consumers’ demand
for currency quality. In this case the optimal price of Fed currency processing
is just the Fed’s marginal cost. In the second version, the “market failure case,”
currency prices do not depend on quality, and the optimal price of Fed currency
processing is less than marginal cost, but strictly greater than zero.
The model is an extension of the general equilibrium monetary model of
Lucas (1980). It is essentially a model of bank processing embedded within
a simple cash-in-advance framework. Articulating such a framework is useful
because it allows us to evaluate Fed currency policy using the standard tools
of welfare economics. In addition, such a framework forces us to be explicit
about the beneﬁts and costs of currency quality and ensures that the “demand,”
“supply,” and “price” of currency quality are modeled in an internally consistent
way.
22 See Goodfriend and King (1988).        
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Many interesting aspects of currency policy are omitted here for the sake
of clarity. Ignored are transportation costs, for example; they would modify
the analysis in obvious ways. Also ignored is the fact that currency comes in
distinct denominations that the public treats very differently; the model assumes
a single denomination. Since the model is designed just to study the pricing of
currency processing, the technology of public and private currency processing
is taken as given.
Currency Processing
Currency, in this model, is either “ﬁt” or “unﬁt.” Currency is ﬁt when ﬁrst
printed. While in circulation, a random fraction ± of ﬁt notes deteriorate each
period and become unﬁt. Thus, ± is both the probability that a given ﬁt note
becomes unﬁt in circulation in a given period and the fraction of ﬁt notes that
become unﬁt during the period.23 The quality of the set of notes that circulate
during period t will be denoted qt, the fraction of the notes that are ﬁt. Thus
if notes of quality qt begin circulating, their average quality at the end of the
current period is (1 ¡ ±)qt.
There are a large number of identical unit banks, and at the beginning of
each period they each receive a deposit of M units of currency from the public.
At the end of the period they each must meet a demand for withdrawal of
M units of currency. A representative bank can deposit notes directly at the
Fed without processing them, or it can process the notes themselves, sending
unsatisfactory notes to the Fed. The bank then withdraws currency from the
Fed in order to meet their own withdrawal demand of M notes. For every note
deposited at the Fed they need to withdraw a note later from the Fed.24
Fed processing sorts all deposited notes into ﬁt and unﬁt notes and destroys
all unﬁt notes. The cost of Fed processing is f(xF
t ) units of labor time, where
xF
t is the number of notes processed by the Fed at time t. The destroyed unﬁt
notes are replaced with newly printed notes. The cost of printing xN
t new notes
at time t is g(xN
t ) units of labor time.
Bank processing is less accurate than Fed processing. When a bank sorts
notes, the satisfactory notes, call them “clean,” are mostly ﬁt but mistakenly
include some unﬁt notes. The unsatisfactory notes, call them “dirty” notes, are
mostly unﬁt but mistakenly include some ﬁt notes. The dirty notes are all sent
23 I am implicitly assuming that there are an inﬁnite number of notes. Variables denoting
quantities of notes should thus be interpreted as fractions of the total currency outstanding.
24 It is possible to modify the model to allow for heterogenous banks, some of which experi-
ence net currency inﬂows each period and some of which experience net currency outﬂows. Private
processing would then involve some shipment of currency from inﬂow banks to outﬂow banks.
Such a model could be used to assess cross-shipping restrictions; banks with net deposit inﬂows
could deposit at the Fed rather than ship to other banks, and banks with net currency outﬂows
could withdraw from the Fed rather than buy from other banks, but banks would be unable to
both deposit and withdraw from the Fed. If transportation costs are positive, cross-shipping has
different effects on differently situated banks.                 
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to the Fed. Let ´ be the fraction of unﬁt notes that the bank classiﬁes as clean,
and let ³ be the fraction of ﬁt notes that the bank classiﬁes as dirty. Thus ´ and ³
represent “error rates” in bank processing.25 Table A–1 displays the amount of
notes in each possible category, assuming that the bank processes xB
t notes itself
at time t, and the quality of notes deposited at the bank is ˆ qt = (1¡±)qt¡1. The
cost of bank processing is h(xB
t ), where xB
t is the number of notes processed.
The quality of the currency disbursed by the bank is determined by the
quality of the currency it receives and by the amount of currency it processes
itself. All of the notes withdrawn from the Fed are ﬁt. The only unﬁt notes the
bank supplies to customers are those mistakenly classiﬁed as clean. Therefore
the quality of notes supplied by the bank, qt, is given by
qt = 1 ¡ ´(1 ¡ ˆ qt)xB
t /M. (1)
This expression relates the quality of notes supplied this period to the amount
of notes processed by banks and ˆ qt, the quality of notes deposited at banks.
The more processing done by banks, the more unﬁt clean notes slip through
without being sent to the Fed for destruction. Thus qt is decreasing in xB
t .
The amount of notes the bank deposits at the Fed is
xF
t = M ¡ xB
t + (1 ¡ ´)(1 ¡ ˆ qt)xB
t + ³ˆ qtxB
t
= M ¡ [´ + (1 ¡ ´ ¡ ³)ˆ qt]xB
t . (2)
The deposit consists of the notes the bank does not process, plus the notes that
the bank processes but ﬁnds dirty. Note that the greater the volume of private
processing, the smaller the volume of Fed processing.
Table A–1 Bank Note Processing During Period t
Note ﬂow Fit Unﬁt
Deposit at the bank ˆ qtM (1 ¡ ˆ qt)M
Sent to the Fed ˆ qt(M ¡ xB
t )( 1 ¡ ˆ qt)(M ¡ xB
t )
Processed by the bank ˆ qtxB
t (1 ¡ ˆ qt)xB
t
Clean (1 ¡ ³)ˆ qtxB
t ´(1 ¡ ˆ qt)xB
t
Dirty, sent to the Fed ³ˆ qtxB
t (1 ¡ ´)(1 ¡ ˆ qt)xB
t
M is the number of notes deposited at time t,ˆ qt is the average quality of notes deposited at time
t, xB
t is the number of notes processed by the bank at time t.
25 In the special case in which ´ = ³ = 0, private processing is just as good as Fed process-
ing at picking out unﬁt notes, and currency quality does not depend on the division of processing
between banks and the Fed. In this case pricing has no effect on the quality of currency in
circulation, although it does inﬂuence economic efﬁciency by affecting the division of processing
between banks and the Fed. The exposition assumes that ´>0.       
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The number of new notes printed is equal to the number of unﬁt notes
deposited at the Fed and is given by
xN
t = (1 ¡ ˆ qt)(M ¡ xB
t ) + (1 ¡ ´)(1 ¡ ˆ qt)xB
t
= (1 ¡ ˆ qt)(M ¡ ´xB
t ). (3)
The greater the volume of private processing, the larger the number of unﬁt
notes escaping destruction each period, and so the smaller the number of new
notes printed.
The General Equilibrium Environment
Currency deposit and withdrawal ﬂows to and from the banking system are
taken as given in the description of currency processing. These ﬂows are de-
termined within a general equilibrium model based on Lucas (1980). There
are a large number of spatially separated locations. At each location there are
representative banks like the one described above, along with a Federal Re-
serve Bank branch. In addition, there are a large number of households at each
location. Each household consists of a pair of agents, a “shopper” that visits
other locations and obtains goods, and a “worker” that stays at home to produce
goods and sell them to visiting shoppers. (Households do not like to consume
the goods produced at their own location.) The cost of reliably verifying a
shopper’s identity at another location is prohibitive, and this precludes the use
of credit arrangements. Thus, shoppers carry currency to exchange for goods.
At the same time the worker stays at home to sell goods to shoppers from other
locations. The currency received by the worker cannot be used by the shopper
during the same period; the shopper must use currency obtained earlier.
The worker produces a consumption good using a constant returns to scale
technology in which one unit of labor time produces one unit of consumption
good. (There is no capital.) The worker is endowed with L units of labor time,
derives no utility from leisure, and so supplies labor inelastically. In addition
to producing a consumption good for sale, the worker is employed outside of
the house for a market wage of wt = 1. Banks and Fed branches hire workers
to process currency.
During the ﬁrst part of each period, households deposit the currency accu-
mulated the previous period at their local bank for safekeeping. Employment
and household production then take place, and wages are credited to the house-
hold’s bank account. At the end of the ﬁrst part of the period, households
withdraw currency for the shopper to use. In the second part of the period the
shopper buys goods for currency, and the worker receives currency for goods.
The shopper then returns home and consumption takes place. Currency is stored
until the next period, and then deposited at the bank. All outstanding currency
is deposited at banks at the beginning of each period; one can imagine that               
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thieves are at large during the ﬁrst part of each period, making privately held
currency risky.
Handling currency is time consuming for the worker, and the quality of
currency affects the amount of time required for currency handling. I assume
that handling ﬁt notes takes no time at all but that handling unﬁt notes takes
time. Speciﬁcally, handling (1¡qt)M unﬁt notes requires Á[(1¡qt)M] units of
labor time, where Á() is an increasing function. This time cannot be used to pro-
duce goods or work outside the house. Currency quality has no other effect on
shoppers or workers. Therefore, we can deﬁne the value of currency quality as
v(qt) = L¡Á[(1¡qt)M], the labor time available for productive activities, net of
the time spent handling currency.26 Currency deteriorates after it has been han-
dled by the worker, but before it has been deposited at the bank the next period.
The number of notes in circulation is M and is held constant throughout the
analysis. The Federal Reserve Banks perform the processing described earlier,
perhaps collecting fees. Any deﬁcit is covered by levying lump-sum taxes on
households.
Optimal Currency Quality
The optimal currency quality maximizes the lifetime utility of a representative
household subject to the resource constraints. Lifetime household utility is P1
t=0 ¯tu(ct), where u(ct) is the utility of total consumption ct at time t, and
0 <¯<1. The economy is constrained each period by the L units of labor
time per household available to be divided between bank and Fed processing,
new note printing, handling unﬁt currency, and the production of consumption
goods. For convenience, deﬁne the function xB(ˆ q,q) as the number of notes
processed by the representative bank when the quality of deposited currency
is ˆ q and the quality of withdrawn currency is q. Deﬁne xF(ˆ q,q) and xN(ˆ q,q)
similarly for Fed processing volume and the number of new notes printed.
Using (1), (2), and (3), we have
xB(ˆ q,q) =
(1 ¡ q)M
(1 ¡ ˆ q)´
xF(ˆ q,q) = M ¡ [´ + (1 ¡ ´ ¡ ³)ˆ q]
(1 ¡ q)M
(1 ¡ ˆ q)´
xN(ˆ q,q) = (q ¡ ˆ q)M.
(4)
26 The dependence of v(qt) = L ¡ Á[(1 ¡ qt)M]o nM is suppressed here because M, the
total number of notes, is held constant throughout the analysis. Note that a nonneutrality is built
into the environment here by having available labor time depend on the number of unﬁt notes;
scaling up the number of notes at each date reduces available resources, independent of the price
level. The optimal policy would seem to be making the number of notes as small as possible.
This obviously runs up against the (unmodeled) constraint that the real value of a note be no
greater than the smallest transaction. Since the money stock is held constant, this nonneutrality
is inconsequential.          
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The following “social planner’s problem” ﬁnds the optimal currency qual-








ct · L ¡ Á[(1 ¡ qt)M] ¡ f[xF(ˆ qt,qt)]
¡ g[xN(ˆ qt,qt)] ¡ h[xB(ˆ qt,qt)]
ˆ qt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)qt
(5)
This programming problem maximizes the representative household’s dis-
counted lifetime utility, subject to the constraint that consumption can be ob-
tained with the labor not devoted to currency handling, currency processing or
currency printing. The ﬁrst-order condition for this optimization problem is
v0(qt)¡h0(xB
t )xB














where, for example, xB
1(ˆ qt,qt) ´ ¶xB(ˆ qt,qt)/¶ˆ qt, xB
2(ˆ qt,qt) ´ ¶xB(ˆ qt,qt)/¶qt,
and so on. The ﬁrst term on the left side is the marginal social beneﬁt of
currency quality, the savings in productive resources from higher average cur-
rency quality. The second and third terms are the marginal reduction in private
processing costs associated with higher currency quality—together these terms
are generally positive because higher quality requires more Fed processing and
thus less private processing. The right side is the marginal social cost of cur-
rency quality—marginal Fed processing costs plus marginal printing costs. The
optimality condition, as usual, is that the total marginal social beneﬁt should
be equated to total marginal social cost. Note that an increase in qt, quality at
date t, increases total costs at date t, but reduces total costs at date t + 1. The
better the quality of currency at date t, the better the quality of the currency
deposited at the beginning of period t + 1.
I restrict attention to steady state equilibria. In a steady state equilibrium,
all variables are constant over time. The condition for optimality in a steady
state equilibrium can be written
v0(q¤)¡h0(xB¤)[xB
2(ˆ q¤,q¤) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)xB
1(ˆ q¤,q¤)]
= f0(xF¤)[xF
2(ˆ q¤,q¤) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)xF
1(ˆ q¤,q¤)]
+ g0(xN¤)[xN
2 (ˆ q¤,q¤) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)xN
1 (ˆ q¤,q¤)],
(7)
where xB¤ = xB(ˆ q¤,q¤), xF¤ = xF(ˆ q¤,q¤), xN¤ = xN(ˆ q¤,q¤), and ˆ q¤ = (1 ¡
±)q¤. q¤ is the optimal steady state currency quality.
The determination of the optimal currency quality is illustrated in Figure 1.
The left side of (7) is plotted as a function of steady state quality q and is                
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labeled MSB. The right side of (7) is labeled MSC. The intersection determines
the optimal currency quality q¤.27
Optimal Price, No Market Failure Case
As a reference point, I ﬁrst derive the optimal currency policy when there is
no “market failure,” in the sense that the willingness of a bank to pay for a
higher-quality note is identical to the total social beneﬁts of a higher-quality
note. I assume that consumers are willing to pay a bank for the value to them
of the quality notes they withdraw. In order for this to hold, consumers must
believe that they will be paid for the quality of notes that they pass on to others,
including banks. Therefore, I need to assume that workers pay shoppers for the
quality of the currency received and that banks pay depositors for the quality
of notes deposited.
Let ˆ ½t be the price paid by banks (over and above par) for ﬁt notes in
period t, so that deposits of M notes of quality ˆ qt at t cost ˆ ½tˆ qtM.28 Let ½t be
the price paid to banks (over and above par) for quality notes withdrawn at t,
so that a bank receives ½tqtM for withdrawals of M notes of quality qt.
A shopper pays ½tqt per note for a withdrawal of notes of average quality
qt at t, and then exchanges the notes for consumption goods. Since a shopper
is unaffected by currency quality, the premium for currency quality paid by
the worker must equal the premium paid by the shopper at the bank. Thus
the worker pays ½tqt per note for currency received from visiting shoppers. A
fraction ± of the ﬁt notes deteriorate and become unﬁt during period t,s ot h e
average quality of the notes is (1 ¡ ±)qt at the beginning of period t + 1. The
bank will pay ˆ ½t+1(1 ¡ ±)qt for these notes at the beginning of next period. If
the worker faces a market real interest rate of r = ¯¡1 ¡ 1, then the present
value of selling the currency next period is ¯ ˆ ½t+1(1 ¡ ±)qt. Thus the “rental
price” of notes with average quality qt is [½t¡¯(1¡±)ˆ ½t+1]qt. This expression
is exactly analogous to the user cost of a durable good, as one would expect.
Given the rental price, the worker chooses a utility-maximizing note quality
which satisiﬁes29
v0(qt) = ½t ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)ˆ ½t+1. (8)
27 Certain mild conditions on the functions v, h, f, and g are required for there to be a unique
interior optimal currency quality.
28 Speciﬁcally, if banks pay pu
t in real terms per unﬁt note and p
f
t per ﬁt note, then pu
t is
par and ˆ ½t = p
f
t ¡ pu
t . One could carry out the analysis in terms of the numbers of ﬁt and unﬁt
notes bought and sold by various parties, rather than in terms of the number of total notes and
the quality of those notes. The latter parameterization allows us to separate quality choice from
the choice of total money holdings.
29 It is straightforward to derive this condition from the household’s maximization problem,
omitted here for brevity.       
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In other words, consumers equate the rental price of currency quality to the
marginal real resource savings from currency quality.
I only consider currency policies that involve deposit and/or withdrawal
charges—there is no quantitative rationing. The Fed pays pD for deposits at
all dates, which is equal to the par value of the currency minus any deposit
charges. The Fed charges pW for withdrawals of currency, par plus any with-
drawal charges. Therefore, the bank pays a net amount of (pW ¡pD) to send a
note to the Fed for processing and then withdraw a note to replace it.
A typical bank essentially solves a static problem each period, maximizing
receipts from currency sales minus outlays for purchased currency, processing
costs, and Fed charges. If the bank buys currency of quality ˆ q and wants to
supply currency of quality q (suppressing time subscripts), it must process
xB(ˆ q,q) notes itself, and send xF(ˆ q,q) notes to the Fed. (These functions were
deﬁned above in [4].) The maximization problem for a typical bank during a
typical period, therefore, is
max
q,ˆ q
½qM ¡ ˆ ½ˆ qM ¡ h[xB(ˆ q,q)] ¡ (pW ¡ pD)xF(ˆ q,q). (9)
The bank maximizes the value received from customers for supplying currency
of quality q, minus the amount paid for currency deposits, minus the bank’s
processing costs, and minus the net cost of depositing and withdrawing cur-
rency from the Fed. The bank’s decision problem reﬂects the social value to
consumers of higher-quality currency through ½, the market value of supplying
higher-quality currency. The bank bears its own processing costs, but does not
directly bear the cost of Fed processing and new note printing. The ﬁrst-order
condition for this problem is
½¡¯(1 ¡ ±)ˆ ½ ¡ h0(xB)[xB
2(ˆ q,q) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)xB
1(ˆ q,q)]
= (pW ¡ pD)[xF
2(ˆ q,q) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)xF
1(ˆ q,q)]. (10)
The bank equates the market value of an improvement in currency quality
[½ ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)ˆ ½], plus the bank’s marginal processing cost savings, to the mar-
ginal cost of Fed processing. Given pW ¡ pD, the ﬁrst-order condition (10)
can be combined with (8) to determine the steady state equilibrium value of q
consistent with bank proﬁt maximization and consumer utility maximization.
v0(q) ¡ h0(xB)[xB
2(ˆ q,q) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)xB
1(ˆ q,q)]
= (pW ¡ pD)[xF
2(ˆ q,q) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)xF
1(ˆ q,q)], (11)
where ˆ q = (1 ¡ ±)q. This shows how the price of Fed currency processing,
pW ¡ pD, determines the equilibrium level of currency quality. Under standard
assumptions, the left side of (11) is decreasing in q, so that an increase in pW¡
pD causes equilibrium currency quality to decrease.
The optimal price of Fed processing, call it ˆ r¤, is the value of pW ¡ pD
that induces an equilibrium level of quality equal to q¤, the optimal quality. If         
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q = q¤, then the left side of (11) is equal to the left side of (7). Therefore, ˆ r¤
must equate the right side of (11) with the right side of (7). This implies that,
ˆ r¤ ´ f0(xF¤) + g0(xN¤)
[xN
2 (ˆ q¤,q¤) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)xN
1 (ˆ q¤,q¤)]
[xF
2(ˆ q¤,q¤) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)xF
1(ˆ q¤,q¤)]
, (12)
where ˆ q¤ = (1¡±)q¤. Equation (12) states that in the absence of market failure
the optimal price of Fed processing is the marginal cost of Fed processing plus
the marginal cost of printing new notes. The latter is the marginal printing cost
per note times the marginal number of notes printed per note processed by
the Fed.
The determination of the optimal price of processing is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. The curve labeled MSB again corresponds to the left sides of (7) and
(11). For a given price of processing, banks and consumers act so as to equate
MSB to (pW ¡ pD)
£
xF
2(ˆ q,q) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)xF
1(ˆ q,q)
¤
, the right side of (11). The
optimal “price” of currency quality, r¤, is just ˆ r¤, the optimal price of Fed
processing, multiplied by xF
2(ˆ q¤,q¤)+¯(1¡±)xF
1(ˆ q¤,q¤), the derivative of Fed
processing volume with respect to steady state quality. If pW ¡ pD = ˆ r¤, then
the equilibrium level of q is q¤, the optimal currency quality. Since there is
no market failure in this case, marginal private willingness to pay is equal to
marginal social beneﬁts, and the optimal price is just marginal social cost.
Optimal Price, Market Failure Case
I now consider the case in which banks do not completely internalize the social
beneﬁts of currency quality. As discussed in the text, the market failure occurs
because currency generally trades at par, with no adjustment for quality. Thus,
banks and consumers do not obtain full compensation for the quality of the
currency they pass on. I implement this case by assuming that ½ = 0, so that
banks receive no compensation for the quality of the currency they supply. I
show that even in this extreme case the optimal price is still strictly positive.
Banks solve the same proﬁt-maximization problem as before, but with
½ = 0. The resulting ﬁrst-order condition is just (10) with ½ = 0. As before,
this condition can be combined with (7), the condition for the optimality of
currency quality, to obtain an expression for the optimal price of Fed processing.
ˆ r¤¤ ´ f0(xF¤) + g0(xN¤)
[xN
2 (ˆ q¤,q¤) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)xN
1 (ˆ q¤,q¤)]
[xF





2(ˆ q¤,q¤) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)xF
1(ˆ Q¤,q¤)]
< ˆ r¤ (13)
Because of the third term, the optimal price is now smaller than ˆ r¤, the optimal
price in the no market failure case. Banks are not compensated for the direct         
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value of currency quality to consumers, so the optimal price of Fed processing
includes a subsidy proportional to v0(q), marginal value of currency quality to
consumers.
The determination of the optimal price of processing in this case is illus-
trated in Figure 2. Again, r¤¤, the optimal “price” of currency quality, is just ˆ r¤¤
multiplied by xF
2(ˆ q¤,q¤) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)xF
1(ˆ q¤,q¤). Marginal private willingness to
pay (MWTP) is the left side of (10) but with v0(q) omitted; it now lies below the
marginal social beneﬁt curve because it does not include the value of currency
quality to consumers. Optimality requires that the price of processing just equal
MWTP at the optimal quality, q¤. Clearly, this requires that the price be below
the price that is appropriate in the no market failure case, so we have ˆ r¤¤ < ˆ r¤.
In the market failure case the optimal price partially subsidizes processing.
Without such a subsidy, banks will not send enough currency to the Fed for
processing, and the quality of currency they supply will be below the optimum.
Note that the optimal price of Fed processing is still strictly positive in
this case. Banks still weigh their own costs against Fed processing charges
in deciding how much currency to process themselves. Fed pricing still must
ensure that the division of processing between the Fed and the private sector
is efﬁcient.
APPENDIX B: DATA SOURCES
Table 1. Operating expenses for currency and coin are from Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, 1991 PACS Expense Report (Board of Gover-
nors 1992): for currency, “total cost, currency service,” p. 215; for coin, “total
cost, coin service,” p. 236. Operating expenses for reserve account balances are
from the Pro Forma Income Statement for Federal Reserve Priced Services, by
Service, 1991, in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 78th
Annual Report, 1991 (Board of Governors 1992), p. 235; operating expenses
for funds transfer and net settlement ($69.3 million) plus commercial ACH
($49.5 million). Replacement costs for currency are calculated by multiplying
6,870,910,000, the number of new notes paid into circulation (1991 PACS Ex-
pense Report, p. 206), by $ .03686, the average cost of new notes delivered to
the Federal Reserve in 1991. The latter was calculated by dividing the cost of
currency printing in 1991, $261,316,379 (78th Annual Report, 1991, Statements
of Revenues and Expenses and Fund Balance, “expenses for currency printing,
issuance, retirement, and shipping,” p. 239), by the number of notes delivered
to the Federal Reserve Banks in 1991, 7,088,967,000 (Board of Governors
database, provided by Ted Kelly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond).     
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Table 2. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1991 PACS
Expense Report (Board of Governors, 1992): processing costs, pp. 199–218;
number of notes received, p. 205. For Printing costs, see above.
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